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624 BERTCH v. Socr.AL WELFARE DEPT, [45 C.2d 
F. No. 19232. In Bank. Nov. 15, 1955.] 
HARRIET JANE BERTCH et al., Appellants, v. SOCIAL 
WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
Old Age Security-Administrative Proceedings--Notice and 
Hearing.-Gov. § 11501, declaring that the procedure 
of any state agency shall be conducted pursuant to the pro-
visions of the chapter on administrative adjudication "only 
as to those functions to which this chapter is made applicable 
by the statutes relating to the particular agency," and enumer-
ating as "included agencies" the Department of Social Welfare 
and the Social Welfare Board, applies only when made ap-
plicable by the statutes relatmg to the particular agency 
involved, and W elf. & Inst. Code, § 104.1, relating to hearings 
by the Social Welfare Board, contain the controlling procedure 
with respect to notice and hearing before such board of appli-
cations for old age assistance under the Old Age Security Act. 
[2] Id.- Administrative Proceedings- Notice and Hearing. -
Where petitioners for old age assistance under the Old Age 
Security Act were given an opportunity to be heard before 
a hearing officer of the Social Welfare Board, and such 
officer's report was then reviewed by the board, there was 
no denial of procedural due process of law. 
[3] !d.-Administrative Proceedings-Mandamus.-On petition 
for writ of mandate to review an administrative order of the 
Social Welfare Board with respect to an application for old 
age assistance, petitioners are not entitled to a trial de novo 
in the superior court where they do not possess a vested 
right, but the right to make application for old age benefits 
provided that they are able to comply with the statutory 
requisites therefor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160 et seq.) 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Eligibility to Receive Assistance.-The need of an 
applicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the Old 
Age Security Law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2000 et seq.) is the 
absence of actual receipt of support by the applicant from 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Old Age Security, §§ 5, 6; Am.Jur., Social 
Security, § 39 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Old Age Security, § 4; Am.Jur., Social Se-
curity, § 40. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Old Age Security, § 10; [3, 5] 
Old Age Security, § 14; [4, 8] Old Age Security, § 6; [6] Old 
Age Security, § 5; [7] Old Age Security, § 7; [9] Old Age Security, 
§ 9; [10] Old Age Security, § 2; [11] Old Age Security, § 11. 
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relatives and the property limitations of the 
law. 
!d.-Administrative Proceedings-Evidence and Findings.-A 
finding of the Social Welfare Board that any grant of old age 
security benefits would not be devoted to the needs 
of the applicants but to the work of church is not Rlrnnnv1r.Prl 
by testimony that they needed "wctuu~<. 
special diets, dentures, ueanu« 
receiving from the church. 
[6] !d.-Alienability of Right to Assistance.-!£ applicants for old 
age assistance are otherwise qualified for benefits under the 
Old Age Security Act, it is immaterial and irrelevant for 
what the money is spent, and if they choose to turn it over 
to a religious institution in return for which they receive care 
at a lower level than if all the money were spent for food, 
clothing and the like, the Social Welfare Board may not place 
a monetary value on the satisfaction such applicants may 
receive in having their spiritual needs fulfilled. 
[7] !d.-Persons Eligible.-Aged persons who are under no eon-
tract for life care with a church and are free to leave the 
church whenever they desire, and who live in a seminary which 
is not supported in whole or in part with public funds, come 
directly within the provisions of W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2160.5, 
relating to aid to an inmate of a home or institution. 
[8] !d.-Eligibility to Receive Assistance.-A person is not in-
eligible to receive old age assistance merely because he may 
be receiving $16 or $18 a month from a church, since the 
church is not obligated to provide such support. (See Welf. 
& Inst. Code,§ 2160, snbd. (e).) 
[9] !d.-Support by Relatives.-Both the letter and spirit of the 
Old Age Security Law clearly show that only the receipt of 
support from responsible relatives should render the applicant 
ineligible for benefits under it. 
[10] !d.-Validity of Statutes.--The care and relief of aged per-
sons who are in need is a special matter of state concern, and 
enactment of the Old Age Security Law, based on a broad 
social policy, does not constitute a gift of public money within 
the constitutional prohibition. 
[11] !d.-Administration Proceedings-Determination of Need.-
While the question of "need" for old age assistance is one of 
fact for the Social Welfare Board, the Legislature has set 
the standard of need and the board must act in accordance 
with the statutory definition. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Albert C. Wollenberg, 
Judge. Reversed. 
fi26 BERTCH v. SomAL WELFARE DEPT. C.2d 
Proceeding in mandamus to review au administrative order 
of the state Social Welfare Board. Judgment denying writ 
reversed. 
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond 1\1. Momboisse, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CAHTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the 
superior court denying a petition for a writ of mandate to 
review an administrative order of the State Social Welfare 
Board. 
Appellants, at all times here pertinent, have been and are 
members of a religious society named Christ's Church of 
the Golden Rule. The members of the church live together 
in a seminary or home owned by the church, located in the 
city and county of San Francisco, and share with each other 
everything they possess. In the petition it is alleged that 
they receive the necessities of life to the extent of an average 
of $17 per month from the religious society although the 
society is not obligated to so provide such necessities. Appel-
lants were in residence at the seminary at the time they 
applied for old age security benefits which were denied. 
(One of the original petitioners left the church and is now 
receiving benefits under the Old Age Security Act.) Peti-
tioners then applied for aid to the boards of supervisors of 
the various counties from which they came, under the pro-
eedure set forth in the Welfare and Institutions Code, and 
from the denials thereof, each petitioner filed an appeal with 
the Social Welfare Board (W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2181.1). 
The board appointed a referee to hear the appeals. A hearing 
was had at which petitioners were represented by counsel. 
The referee submitted his findings to the board; the board 
denied the appeals. Petitioners then filed a petition for a 
writ of mandate in the Superior Court of the City and County 
of San Francisco, seeking a review of the matter both as to 
the law and the facts. 
The basic question involved on this appeal is whether or 
not petitioners are "needy" persons within the provisions of 
the Old Age Security Act. It is conceded that they all possess 
the age and residence qualifications set forth in section 2160 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Before discussing the 
Nov.1955] BERTCH v. SoCIAL WELFARE DEPT. 
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question of the need of petitioners, however, several pre-
liminary matters must be first disposed of. 
Petitioners argue that certain findings of the hearing officer 
were changed by the board without notice to them or an 
opportunity for them to be heard. They point to no specific 
finding which was changed. Petitioners contend the pro-
cedure outlined in section 11517, subdivisions (b) and (c), of 
the Government Code, should have been followed; the board 
contends that the procedure set forth in sections 104.1, 104.2, 
104.3 and 104.5 was the proper method. [1] Preliminarily, 
it should be noted that section 11501 of the Government Code 
provides: ''Extent to which procedttre conducted pursuant 
to chapter: Agencies included. (a) The procedure of any 
agency shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this 
chapter only as to those functions to which this chapter is 
made applicable by the statutes relating to the partimdar 
agency." (Emphasis in body of statute added.) As "in-
cluded agencies'' are set forth the Department of Social 
Welfare and the Social Welfare Board. It is our opinion 
that the board's contention that the section means it is to 
apply only when made applicable by the statutes relating 
to the particular agency involved is meritorious. In different 
sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the provisions 
of the Government Code are made directly applicable (see 
§§ 1624, 1625, 2304, 2305, 2355, 2356, all of which relate to 
permits or licenses or revocation thereof, or supervision of 
life-care contracts). It appears then that the board is correct 
in its contention that sections 104.1 et seq. of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code contain the controlling procedure. 
Section 104.1 provides in part that any applicant or re-
cipient for aid who is dissatisfied with the action of the 
county board of supervisors ''shall . . . upon filing a petition 
with the State Department of Social vVelfare, have the right 
of appeal and shall be accorded an opportunity for a fair 
hearing. The department shall set such appeal for hearing 
before the State Social Welfare Board and shall give all 
parties concerned written notice of the time and place of 
such hearing.'' The applicant is to appear in person either 
with or without counsel of his choice ; the board is to con-
sider the appeal and either dismiss it or award aid in com-
pliance with the terms of the code. Section 104.2 provides 
that if such an applicant feels aggrieved by any decision of 
the board, he may petition the superior court of the county 
of his residence for a ''review of the entire proceedings in 
528 BJlRTCH v. :::lOCIAL WEU'ARE DEPT. [45 C.2d 
of law involved in the ea.se. Such 
a distinct and cumulative remedy. The 
State Social Welfare Board shall be the sole respondent in 
such added.) Section 104.5, sub-
: "[Referee's report: Final Decision.] 
is not heard by the board, 
shall be prepared the referee 
together with any data the party 
appealing may shall be presented to the board for 
final decision. Only the board may make such final decision." 
Under section 11517, subdivisions (b) and (c), of the 
Government Code, if the proposed decision of the hearing 
officer is not by the agency, "The agency itself may 
decide the ease upon the record, including the transcript, 
with or without taking additional evidence, or may refer 
the case to the same or another hearing officer to take addi-
tional evidence .... The agency itself shall decide no case 
provided for in this subdivision without affording the parties 
the opportunity to present either oral or written argument 
before the agency itself. If additional oral evidence is intro-
duced before the agency itself no agency member may vote 
unless he heard the additional oral evidence." 
Petitioners contend that "unless he who hears decides" 
(Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 [56 S.Ct. 906, 80 
L.Ed. 1288]) there has been a denial of due process of law. 
In Leeds v. Gray, 109 Cal.App.2d 874 [242 P.2d 48], the 
petitioner was a referee of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board; charges were preferred against him. He had 
a hearing before a hearing officer at which no board member 
was present. The hearing officer made no findings, no deci-
sion or recommendation. The Personnel Board reviewed the 
1ranscript of the proceedings and made certain findings, after 
which he was ordered demoted. The court there said in 
holding there had been no denial of due process: "Petitioner, 
of course, was entitled to a fair and full hearing. The fact 
that a fact finding tribunal does not see or hear the witnesses 
does not in every instance constitute a denial of such hearing. 
For example, many court proceedings are determined upon 
affidavits. There the court neither sees nor hears the wit-
nesses. A fair and full hearing is given where the fact finder 
fully reviews the record and an opportunity is given the 
parties to argue their contentions as to the credibility of 
the witnesses and the other matters involved in the proceed-
ing. This was done in our case by briefs. It is true that 
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no proposed findings or decision were submitted to the parties 
and no opportunity given to argue concerning them, but 
where the board itself is passing on the record, fully con-
siders it and the arguments presented, on the merits, there 
is no requirement that the board permit further argument 
on its proposed findings and decision, and no logical reason 
therefor." (Pp. 883, 884.) (See California Shipbuilding 
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 536 [165 P.2d 669] ; 
Cooper v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal.2d 242 
[217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593] .) [2] It would appear 
that under the situation here present where petitioners were 
given a full opportunity to be heard before the hearing officer 
whose report was then reviewed by the board, there was no 
denial of procedural due process of law. 
Petitioners next argue that they should have been given 
a trial de novo in the superior court. In other words, it is 
contended that the trial court should have based its decision 
on the facts as well as the law. Petitioners rely upon Laisne 
v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 
P.2d 457], and Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors 
& Embalmers, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848], for the proposition 
that in reviewing an order of a statewide administrative 
agency, the superior court must exercise its independent 
judgment on the law and the facts where constitutional rights 
are involved. The Drummey and Laisne cases stand for the 
rule that an ''existing valuable privilege'' may not be taken 
away by an administrative order without giving the person 
so deprived the opportunity of having the finality of such 
action passed upon by a court of law (13 Cal.2d 75, 84). 
[3] Petitioners here were not possessed of a vested right, 
but the right to make application for old age benefits pro-
vided that they were able to comply with the statutory pre-
requisites therefor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160 et seq.) It 
would appear, therefore, that petitioners were not entitled to 
a trial de novo in the superior court. 
Petitioners' major contention is that they are deprived of 
old age benefits by reason of their membership in Christ's 
Church of the Golden Rule and that such deprivation is a 
denial of freedom of religion and a denial of equal protection 
of the laws within the meaning of both the federal and state 
Constitutions. 
The Social Welfare Board found that when petitioners 
joined the church they gave up all their worldly possessions 
to promote its objects; that they have performed duties im-
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posed upon them as such and that petitioners 
received "full, complete, and adequate support from said'' 
church; and "That to the extent that any of the appellants 
were in need within the meaning of the Old Age Security 
Law, they were so as a result of a continuing voluntary 
acceptance of lower standards of living in accordance with 
their adherence to the precepts of Christ's Church of the 
Golden Rule and their entrance into 'the religious apostolic 
society form of living.' " Finding VI is "That all or a 
major portion of any grant of Old Age Security made to 
the appellants would not be devoted to meeting their indi-
vidual and personal needs as those needs are defined by the 
Welfare and Institutions Code and the Manual of Policies 
and Procedures of the State Department of Social Welfare. 
but would, on the contrary, be devoted systematically and 
continuously to the adYancement of the objectives of Christ's 
Church of the Golden Rule." Finding VII is "That none 
of the appellants is or since ,January 20, 1948, has been under 
any so-called 'life care' contract whereby gifts or transfer 
of property were made to be used for the support, main-
tenance, or care of the donor thereof. '' 
[4a] We said in County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, 
20 Cal.2d 870, 875 [129 P.2d 378], that the "'need' of the 
applicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the law is 
defined by the Legislature to be the absence of actual receipt 
of support by the applicant from responsible relatives and 
by the property limitations of the law.'' Let us then look 
to see how the law defines "need." 
Section 2160, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), sets forth the age 
and citizenship and residence requirements which are not here 
involved or questioned. Section 2160 (e) provides in part: 
"Persons who are inmates of a boarding home or other institu-
tion not supported in whole or in part by public funds shall 
be granted aid but no such aid shall be granted if such 
persons are cared for under a contract for a period of time 
exceeding one month; ... " Subsection (f) provides that 
aid shall be granted to such an aged person "Who is not 
receiving adequate support from a husband or wife, or child 
able and responsible under the laws of this State to furnish 
such support; free board and lodging supplied to an applicant, 
because of his necessity, by a friend or relative who is not 
responsible for his support, shall not be grounds for refusing 
aid"; subsection (g) provides that aid shall be granted to 
such an aged person "Who has not made any voluntary 
BER'fCH SoCIAL WELFARE DEPT. 531 
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of property the purpose of qualify-
ing for such aid." (Emphasis added.) Section 2160.5 pro-
vides: "Notwithstanding any provision of subdivision (e) 
of Section 2160 to the contrary, aid shall be granted to any 
person who is an inmate of a home or institution maintained 
any or other nonprofit organization 
if the organization has not been paid for the life care and 
maintenance of the person through assessment of or dues of 
said inmate or whether or not the person has agreed 
or promised to pay for his maintenance in the event that 
he receives any pension, bequest, devise, or other inheritance. 
"The county from which such inmate came to such home 
shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered the resi-
dence of such inmate to grant such aid." 
Sections 2163 et seq. set forth the amount of personal prop-
erty which may be owned by persons otherwise eligible for 
aid and the valuation of real property which if owned would 
render such persons ineligible for aid. Section 2010 provides 
that "No question, inquiry, or recommendation under the 
authority of this chapter or the rules of the State Department 
of Social Welfare shaJJ relate to the political or religious 
opinions or afiiliations of any person, and no grant or denial 
of aid under this chapter shall be in any manner affected 
or influenced by such opinions or afiiliations." A specific 
finding was made to the effect that this section had not been 
violated by county or state officials. 
Section 2020 provides that "The amount of aid to which 
any applicant shall be entitled shall be, when added to the 
income (including the value of currently used resources, but 
excepting casual income and inconsequential resources) of 
the applicant from all other sources, seventy-five dollars ($75) 
per month. If, however, in any case it is found the actual 
need of an applicant exceeds seventy-five dollars ($75) per 
month, such applicant shall be entitled to receive aid in an 
amount, not to exceed seventy-five dollars ($75) per month, 
which when added to his income (including the value of 
currently used resources, but excepting casual income and 
inconsequential resources) from all other sources, shall equal 
his actual need.'' 
There is no finding that petitioners made any voluntary 
assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of qualify-
ing for old age assistance (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160, subd. 
(g)) ; there is no finding that petitioners are disqualified by 
reason of owning either personal or real property in excess 
G32 BEl~'l'Cll 
of the statutory valuations. that are 
receiving full, complete and adequate support from their 
church (if material) must be examined in the light of the 
record which shows that they each receive from $16 to $18 
per month in food, clothing and medicine. This is not denied 
by the board. [5] The finding that any grant of old age 
security benefits would not be devoted to the needs 
of the applicants but to the work of the church (if material) 
does not appear to be supported by the record: many testified 
that they needed clothing, or medicine. or proper food, or 
special diets, or dentures, hearing aids, etc. which they were 
not receiving from the church. We find nothing in the record, 
nor does the board point to any provision in the Welfare 
and Institutions Code which places any limitation on the 
use for which, or to which, money received under the act 
must be put. As a matter of fact, the board's Manual of 
Policies and Procedures. section A 140, provides: "No pro-
vision of the 0. A. S. Law requires or purports to require 
that income received by any person, whether a recipient of 
aid or one who has been a recipient of aid, shall be expended 
by that person for particular purposes or in particular 
amounts." [6] If the applicants are otherwise qualified 
for benefits under the act, it would appear completely imma-
terial and irrelevant for what the money is spent. If they 
choose to turn it over to a religious institution in return 
for which they receive care at a lower level than if all the 
money -were spent for food, clothing and the like, is the board 
to place a monetary value on the satisfaction such applicants 
may receive in having their spiritual needs fulfilled? If an 
applicant receives $75 per month and gives $50 of it each 
month to the Catholic or any Protestant church, is the aid 
to cease because considered unnecessary? We would think 
not. 
[7] Petitioners are under no contract for life care with 
the Church of the Golden Rule; they are free to leave the 
church whenever they desire. 'l'he seminary in which they 
live is not supported in whole or in part with public funds. 
It appears to us that as a matter of law, petitioners come 
directly within the provisions of section 2160.5 >vhich provides 
that aid shall be granted to any person who is an inmate 
of a home or institution maintained by any benevolent ''or 
other nonprofit organization if the organization has not been 
paid for the life care and maintenance of the person through 
assessment of or dues of said inmate or otherwise, whether 
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or not the person has agreed or promised to pay for his 
maintenance in the event that he receives any pension, bequest, 
devise, or other inheritance." In addition, they are not 
receiving assistance from any legally responsible relative 
(W elf. & Inst. Code, § 2160, subd. (f)). 
The board makes much of the fact that when the church 
corporation was organized in 1944 as a nonprofit organization, 
all members turned over all their property to the corporation 
which purchased various business organizations therewith in 
which all members able to work were required to do so. This 
corporation went through bankruptcy in 1945. In 1946, some 
of the original members, including petitioners, organized a 
'' nonincorporated association'' and had released to themselves 
certain of the commercial projects which had been operated 
by the bankrupt corporation. [8] It is apparently the 
board's position that the income from the various enterprises 
is sufficient to support, adequately, the petitioners. A com-
plete answer to this contention is that whether or not $16 
or $18 per month is adequate support, the church is not obli-
r;ated to provide it. The code (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2160, 
sub d. (e)) provide;;; that ".Aid shall be granted under this 
chapter to any person ... (f) Who is not receiving adequate 
support from a husband or wife, or c.hil.d able and responsible 
under the laws of this State to furnish such support; free 
board and lodging sttpplied to an appZ.icant. becanse of his 
necessity, by a friend or relative who is not responsible for 
his support, shall not be ground for refusing aid." (Emphasis 
added.) [4b] As we said in the r~a Fuente case (20 Cal.2d 
870, 875) " ... the 'need' of the applicant necessary to 
qualify for the benefits of the law is defined by the Legislature 
to be the absence of actual receipt of support by the applicant 
from responsible relatives and by the property limitations 
of the law." [9] We also said (p. 876) "Both the letter 
and the spirit of the Old Age Security Law clearly show that 
only the receipt of support from responsible relatives should 
render the applicant ineligible for benefits under it.'' 
[10] The board argues that if old age benefits are paid 
to these petitioners it would be, in fact. a grant of aid to a 
religious sect and unconstitutional as a gift of public funds. 
We held in County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 
Cal.2d 870, 876, 877, that the care and relief of aged persons 
who are in need is a special matter of state concern and 
that the enactment of the Old Age Security Law, based upon 
334 BERTCH v. SoCIAL WELFARE DEPT. C.2d 
a broad social did not constitute a public 
money within the constitutional prohibition. 
[11] The board argues that the question of "need" rs 
one of fact for the board and cites Newbold v. Soeial 
Board, 76 Cal.App.2d 844 [174 P.2d 482], and 
State Board of Social Welfare, 82 627 [ 186 P .2d 
429], in support of the statement. '\Vith ihis statement there 
can be no argument. However, the has seen fit 
to set the standard of need and the board mnst act in accord 
ance with the statutory definition. We have heretofore dis-
cussed the statutory requirements to be met by persons apply-
ing for old age assistance and it appears to us that petitioners. 
so far as can be ascertained, meet those requirements. 
It is our opinion that the findings that petitioners 
are receiving adequate support from Christ's Church of the 
Golden Rule and that they are in need because of their "volun-
tary acceptance of the lower standards of living" prescribed 
by the church, as well as the finding that all, or a major 
portion, of any aid received would be devoted to the church 
are immaterial when considered in the light of the applicable 
statutes as heretofore set forth and discussed. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority opinion con-
cedes, as it must, that "the question of 'need' is one of fact 
for the board [Social Welfare J " but avoids the board's 
finding by holding that "the Legislature has seen fit to set 
the standard of need'' and that petitioners as a matter of 
law come within the preseribed standard. Certainly I agree 
that the Legislature has, within limits, set the standard, 
but in respect to the fact question as to whether the peti-
tioners, upon the record, as a matter of law fall within that 
standard, I agree with the Social Welfare Board and with 
the superior court rather than with the majority. In my view 
the majority opinion unduly extends the concept of ''need'' 
which is basic to the philosophy and required by the letter 
of the statutes governing the granting of old age security. 
The opinion relies, among other things, upon isolated state-
ments from Cmlnty of Los A.ngeles v. La Fuente (1942) 
20 Cal.2d 870 [129 P.2d 378], a ease which dealt with a situa-
tion materially different from that presented here, and which 
is hereinafter discussed. 
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The law which of aid by the state 
to the has since its be<'n b"'''d upon the concept 
of need. It was provided by Stats. 1929, ch. 530, p. 914, § 1, 
as it is now by section 2001 of the 'vVelfare and Insti-
tutions Code, that residents of the state are entitled to aid 
in old age ''if in need.'' The petitioners here. according-
to the findings of the State Socia I Welfare Board, and of 
the superior court, are not in need. In accord with their 
beliefs they have transferred all their property to Christ's 
Church of the Goldfm Rule. They all perform tasks, accord-
ing to their abilities, at the theological seminary. In accord 
with the canon law of the church. "A" the material needs of 
the various persons and their families and dependents must 
of necessity be met to permit these persons to dedicate their 
work, services, and studies to carry out the religious purposes 
of the ecclesiastical society, thr religious apostolic society form 
of living is selected as the means to accomplish thesP results 
. . '' and ''The ecclesiastical Church GoYernment shall deter-
mine how much is necessary for the common community 
treasury to carry out the religious purposes through the 
apostolic society form of living." The petitioners subscribe 
10 these tenets. 
The board has further found that petitioners ''are now 
receiving, full, complete, and adequate support including 
incidental expenses from said Christ's Church of the Golden 
Rule, of which they are membrrs, through the Elected Del-
egates Committee, a temporal agency of said Christ's Church 
of the Golden Rule in accordance with their needs as they 
and the said Christ's Church determined them to exist'' ; 
''That to the extent that any of the appellants were in need 
within the meaning of the Old Age Srcurity Law. they were 
so as a result of a continuing voluntary acceptance of lower 
standards of living in accordance with their adherence to 
the precepts of Christ's Church of the Golden Rule and their 
entrance into 'the religious apostolic society form of living' "; 
and ''That all or a major portion of any grant of Old Age 
Security made to the appellants would not be devoted to 
meeting their individual and personal needs as those needs 
are definrd by the Welfare aml Institutions Code and the 
Manual of Policies and Procedures of the State Department 
of Social Welfare. but would. on the contrary, be devoted 
systematically and continuously to the advancement of the 
objectives of Christ's Church of the Golden Rule." 
It thus appears that although petitioners do not have en-
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In County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942), supra, 
20 Cal.2d 870, this court afflrmed a judgment for plaintiff 
county for reimbursement for old age benefits furnished to 
the parents of defendant. It was shown that defendant was 
financially able to contribute to the support of her parents. 
The parents had refused the child's offer to support them 
in her home. It was held (p. 875 of 20 Cal.2d) that this 
refusal of support in the home did not render the parents 
ineligible for old age assistance. 
In the La Fuente case it is said (as stated at [ante, 
p. 533] of the majority opinion) that "the 'need' of the ap-
plicant necessary to qualify for the benefits of the law is de-
fined by the Legislature to be the absence of actual receipt of 
support by the applicant from responsible relatives [those 
who, according to law, owe a duty of support] and by the 
property limitations of the law" (p. 875 of 20 Cal.2d). But 
this statement should be considered in the context in which 
it was made; i.e., in a case where this court was considering, 
in effect, whether aged parents should be deprived of old 
age assistance because they preferred to maintain their own 
home with such aid rather than to be forced to accept the 
offer of an inharmonious residence with their child. If the 
quoted statement from the La Fuente case is read literally 
out of context, then every aged person in the state who has 
no relatives liable for his support, and whose property is 
less than that stated in sections 2163 and 2164 of the ·welfare 
and Institutions Code, is entitled to old age assistance regard-
less of his income. Such is not the law. (See Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 2020: "The amount of aid to which any applicant 
shall be entitled shall be, when added to the income (including 
the value of currently used resources, but excepting casual 
income and inconsequential resources) of the applicant from 
all other sources, eighty-five dollars ( $85) per month. If, 
however, in any case it is found the actual need of an applicant 
exceeds eighty-five dollars ($85) per month, such applicant 
shall be entitled to receive aid in an amount, not to exceed 
eighty-five dollars ($85) per month, which when added to 
his income (including the value of currently used resources, 
but excepting casual income and inconsequential resources) 
from all other sources, shall equal his actual need.") Thus 
•• actual need'' and ''income ••• from all other sources'' are 
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elements integral to the legislative plan; being integral to 
the plan, it seems essential that the agency charged with its 
administration shall have power within the scope of the plan 
to make the practical factual determinations incidental to 
its application. 
Some argument has been advanced to the effect that peti-
tioners are being deprived of a right to dispose of their state 
aid as they may see fit. There is no such holding either by 
the administrative agency or the superior court. The argu-
ment begs the question by assuming that petitioners are 
entitled as a matter of law to receive the aid. Until and 
unless they become entitled to receive it, they should not be 
heard to argue a right to dispose of it. We therefore need 
not consider an opposing argument suggesting the profits 
which might be garnered by a smooth-talking promoter who 
under the guise of religious, political or social theme could 
sell old persons on a plan of contributing $85 a month to 
the ''Master,'' together with such personal services as they 
were able to render, all for a roof and keep on frugal scale. 
These petitioners have elected to live modestly in their 
communal, religious fashion; they are enjoying the material, 
social and spiritual compensations which they find therein. 
In my view, the finding of the board, in substance, made on 
substantial evidence, that they have voluntarily accepted 
such a standard and circumstances of living as fulfilling their 
needs, and hence are not persons in need, is not, as held in 
the majority opinion [ante, p. 534] immaterial, but is vital 
and determinative. I would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J ., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
14, 1955. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
